Friday, December 3, 2010

Intel Corporation Competition Case Update - Intel Monopoly and Fraud Against the Government.

Demand Intel Corp. Transparency and Accountability.

"Re: Intel Corporation Competition Case Update
- FTC Investigator Notice of Fiduciary Failure in Docket 9341
- Added pointers calculating 9341 consumer monopoly overcharge
- Lettered Relator Seeks Attorney; FCA, 31 USC 3279, recovery of monopoly & fraudulent cost imposed on Federal Government’s Intel based PC purchases.

FTC Inspector General, Senate, Congress, State Attorney Generals, U.S. Attorneys, FTC & SEC Commissioners, Director Mueller, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder, DOJ Antitrust, DOJ Cartel Divisions and Vice President Joseph Biden:

On non address of $47.2386 billion# consumer recoverable and no antitrust remedies associated with FTC v Intel Corporation Docket 9341 consent order, please find analyst comment on reorganizing Federal Trade Commission toward financial self sufficiency, pros and cons of Section 5 for competitive case investigation, summation of Intel Inside tied charge back, additional production examples on which 9341 Intel consumer recovery estimates are calculated.

Consumer Monopoly Overcharge
Similar to prior Intel production examples 9341 consumer recovery pointers document monopoly overcharge early in Docket 9341 review period.

Herein five examples 1999 through mid 2002 are meant to show economic cause why Intel Network manipulation of FTC v Intel Docket 9288. That cause is Intel intent to monopolize markets for the next decade actively concealed in real time at that time by an inter nation Cartel.

A cartel composed of Intel, PC Dealers, Media Sales Agents, investment banking, security operatives, corporate political relations and network confidence agents embedded by Intel and Media Sales Agents into x86 competitors to steal from and dismantle competition.

A network of extended relation’s who have long time concealed Intel vertical by horizontal matrix of integrated dealing cells streaming intra platform computers to end buyers in system field effects. Where Federal authority in position to resolve systematic economic crime, have not, raising the question of blocker or detractor?

Nothing in Docket 9341 consent order addresses these facts, continued Nation, society harms and consumer financial recoveries form this history of anticompetitive system’s conduct, racketeering, industrial and economic espionages understood by industry players for nearly two decades. And many in government authority who seemingly sit on the side lines?

Where, in fact, the extent of those in DC with knowledge of the high level case investigation is really quite extensive.
“If such combinations be not destroyed all the advantages which would naturally come to
the public operating under the general laws of competition, will be lost, and the entire
commerce of an immense territory will be at the mercy of a single holding company.”

Justice Harlan Stone

All aspects of Intel monopolization beyond commercial fraud remain deleted from Docket 9341 consent order as accepted by FTC Commissioner’s on November 1. Resulting in this third Federal example of Intel Corporation dodging competition, racketeering and espionage violations pursuant to three investigative tracks that validate Federal agency failures to regulate competition, racketeering, cross enterprise, cross profession network crime including resulting economic espionages; DOJ v Intel 1991 – 1993, FTC v Intel Docket 9288 1998 – 2001, FTC v Intel Docket 9341 2009-2010.

How is one to explain the result of this continuous compounded series of misfeasance across
Intel case matters for nearly two decades?

FTC Reorganization

On two of three Intel case anomalies this analyst suggests the Federal Trade Commission should be reconfigured for financial self sufficiency. $47.2386 billion and antitrust remedies is a lot of funding to leave off the table.

Too earn its keep can FTC be reconfigured to lead virtual competition case actions? Like any private plaintiff attorney partnership paid for monitoring, regulation, investigation, leading case work for competitive recovery from the very corporations the agency is suppose to regulate under Sherman and Clayton Acts.

Too modernize an agency held captive by the political agenda of corporate legal guild in relation to employment and professional placements beyond the agency itself. Including where corporate political and institutional influences are often responsible for making and sustaining employment placements in those agency’s in question.

Obviously not a fault of the institution or its Congressional Charter but of society and the personal boundaries of individual actor’s responsible for implementing and overseeing that charter. And where there are questions of oversight perhaps State Attorney Generals should be included as added check under FTC Congressional charter? Certainly more desirable than this Relator. Where, perhaps, State Attorney Generals should be able to initiate and oversee cases within FTC for spot control across the country?

Who’s been minding shop in DC? Where Intel case matters are concerned why are the continued symptoms of regulatory, oversight, corporate law enforcement and attorney fiduciary dysfunction so pronounced and for so long?

In the face of Intel Network again demonstrating administration of corporate and attorney fraternal ties that are greater than the Federal Power itself, making FTC financially self sufficient is designed to increase competitive effectiveness, to cut corporate ties, earn its keep under Charter on the very recoveries FTC is supposed to be delivering. No different from Relator under False Claims Act.

Why shouldn’t FTC be rewarded operating returns
on antitrust and commerce case recoveries?

In doing so like any partnership offer an incentive to federal employees on that return, under the Federal Power, which would surely keep FTC focused on the high value cases. With of course some ratio of funding for all other types of matters that require attention.

Delivering on the administrative front a lean organization in step with its ability to self sustain organically. To counter corporate guild control it just might take a separate stronger independent public partnership.

On FTC case review under Section 5 of Antitrust Act

Having participated in two Section 5 investigations of Intel competitive practices; Dockets 9288 directly with FTC investigating attorney Mr. Lin, 9341 through attorney team liaisons Ms. Espeldon, Ms. Kransky and Mr. Cox, this analyst’s stated view has been that Section 5 offers an all encompassing umbrella to research, discover, validate Intel Network program and practices that harm competition and consumers. Providing broad vantage to detect and calculate the costs of Sherman and Clayton Act violations on enterprises, industries, consumers, society and Nations.

For 9341 perhaps Section 5 should not be considered an unusual first approach to research and validate antitrust claims and harms. Two decades of Intel Network concealing and misrepresenting harms and costs on competition and consumers requires a broad approach to systematically filter from superset too subset for stringent structural proofs.

Pointers and proofs decomposed from a monopoly broth relied on to conceal and divert from active system, structure and economic findings, error detection and correction through three Federal
investigations, that is Intel Network monopolization for much too long.

Favorably Section 5 has revealed a springboard too evolve Section 2 case precedent concerning industry competitive effects claimed to cause competitor harms that may also be competition and consumer harms. Where Section 5 investigation has filled a gap in antitrust enforcement revealing a Section 1 path too hear on industry competitive claims.

Claims that are industry causes within system, structure and economic proofs of competition and consumer harms under Sherman, Clayton Acts, commerce and racketeering laws. This path to remedy industry claims through Section 1 affirmative findings offers a bracket too review and evolve Section 2 case precedent for industry competitors.

Long time industry claims are worth judicial review within the bracket of established antitrust, commerce and racketeering case precedent. On this strategy the total case cannot be lost; only won. Where it’s more important than ever for Commission too actively exercise its full Congressional authority under Section 5 judicial hearing.

Two decades of Intel Network concealing espionage that is intended to monopolize multiple industries and markets through corporate political multipoint manipulation of Federal, State, and inter nation authority by organized network crime cannot be left unresolved.

Anyone in DC who continues along non address of antitrust, criminal and commercial fraud should be questioned. And if incapable of doing this job for fear of what Intel Network will do to you and your family as done to mine find someone capable to do that job. Mr. Holder, Mr. Mueller, Ms. Varney please place individuals into these positions who will do the job. No more varnishing over eighteen years of a compounding misfeasance.

The FTC has shown itself hampered in monitoring, regulating, remedying Intel corporate crime network. The U.S. DOJ through its inaction is suspect of similar. The FBI informed of Intel marketing Media Agent spy ring over a decade ago and there are still no arrests? While these known individuals have buried themselves deeper into strategic influence positions in technology industry and society. One has to ask why and what’s the next step toward reorganizing Federal agencies for competition espionage and cartel case effectiveness for industry, public and Nation good.

Everyone close to these case matters knows the real Intel; society damaging enabler of cross enterprise, cross profession organized network crime. Demonstrating debilitating affects on society Intel Corporate Political Network must be reformed to achieve any rational level of enterprise, industry and competition reform. Docket 9341 consent order fails to state any antitrust remedies.

This analyst believes Docket 9341 consent order will be ineffective on sole address of industry commercial frauds and futile to administer from antitrust conduct left unaddressed. Apparently not to be monitored under the order?

Under 9341 consent order, provision for Intel internal monitors of the order’s provisional frameworks has been established by the FTC. However, ironically, the very act of compliance monitors identifying out of bounds anti competitive practices, and pressing Intel for correction, can be reversed too Intel’s advantage under the order.

Typical of Intel style a provision within the order enables compliance monitor’s to be dismissed by Intel for monitoring anticompetitive compliance beyond the order itself. Thisloop hole in compliance monitoring is significant and places monitors under Intel control. And other than for compliance monitors who are Intel moles presents a loosing proposition for any credible monitor.
Some academic attorneys suggest fault in FTC Section 5 to convene an investigation to find proofs of unfair methods of industry competition and deceptive practices that may not fit judicial interpretation within the range of established consumer antitrust cases. I acknowledge the criticism and FTC should have better prepared their complaint.

That is to state specific Clayton Act and Sherman Act Violations harming consumers under Anti Trust Section 5 authority in the face of Judiciary up front.

Where I suggest the key mistake blindly following parallel actions which contain built in faults ahead of 9341 research opening up the 9288 affirmative discovery paths. All the while FTC remained surrounded within the traditional confines of an Intel invented reality of no foul driven by Intel long time network manipulation intended to keep it that way.

Noteworthy Docket 9341, similar to Docket 9288 Section 5 investigation again deflects from channel causes that are antitrust true positives, to industrial causes that may or may not fit judicial interpretation as competition and consumer antitrust harms. Plaintiff causes repositioned by media to deflect from Intel Dealer and Media Sales Agent tied channel monopolization known too harm competition and consumers.

Including tactics per se condemned by the Sherman and Clayton Acts that is price fixed product routing and structured market rigging, deflected toward the litigation trap of whether industrial harms harm consumers.

Where case focus is deflected in this fashion, directed away from known antitrust violations toward industry harms that might fit as competition and consumer harms, Section 5 questions are raised.

This analyst would like to propose a corporate political concern with FTC reliance on Section 5. A transparency concern that Section 5 is being used to mask competition espionage and the crime syndicates responsible for concealing them.

And discovery rules which grant Intel advance notice on what evidence to destroy or alter. And while there are multiple discovery cross checks to determine if Intel has destroyed or altered evidence, wouldn’t it be more effective to obtain a warrant on pointers and proofs, raid Intel, PC Dealers and Media Sales Agents, capture suspect and supporting documents and subsequently conceal discovery focus until the refined complaint is filed and criminal prosecution paths determined.

For a RICO case confronting the largest most financially destructive inter nation cartel in the history of modern business why would there be any other way? Perhaps this is not the FTC’s fault in poking around with their Section 5 action but indicative of drag within the U.S.DOJ Antitrust and Cartel divisions not stepping up to the plaintiffs desk sooner?

And FBI, where a problem in the San Francisco Bureau has been known for over a decade where Washington including the Director himself has always been copied on the complete case investigation as it progressed. Continued inaction in the case is a telling indicator of continued dysfunctional governance.

Network manipulation of FTC Section 5 inquiry has twice now confused and misinformed academics, attorneys, influencing observers, Congress and Senate affecting working views from information withheld. Has stymied DOJ, FTC, industry plaintiff case outcomes and how many others?

By Intel Network deflecting commercial harm of their tied Dealer channel toward industry claims of harm that may or may not fit judicial interpretation of competition and consumer harms. The history of Intel investigation under 9341 & 9288 Section 5 has made government appear ineffective.

On 9341 repeated result of 9288; encompassing voids in overall remedies, Section 5 method again falls short by failing to tell the whole story. Similar to 9288 system, structure and economic violations that prove intent to monopolize have been left out of 9341 consent order. In doing so refocus on industry competitor conduct has caused confusion that Intel competitor harms may not be competitive antitrust and consumer harms. Obviously the most efficient way to address any litigation is facts on focused claims.

I suggest ambiguity the downfall of Section 5 method in relation to a laser beam focus to hearSherman and Clayton Act violations from the start.

Supporting secondary focus on industry commercial frauds that are competitor harms for their determination by the court as competition and consumer harms.

This upfront approach of discovery raid followed by complaint and criminal prosecution addresses criticism for FTC action out of the pubic and judicial oversight where a new layer of FTC law may now be added under established law. Perhaps too establish a layer of guild law under Federal competition law?

Or reaffirm Intel law above the Federal Power and Nation’s law? FTC, DOJ, U.S. Attorneys and State Attorney Generals supporting judicial review to determine whether competitor harms are also competition and consumer harms would undo these concerns.

With Section 1 focus removes the question of chasing down Intel on false positives. And makes FTC and DOJ leader’s in supporting virtual private law satellites by detailing known discovery paths to affirmative antitrust true positives, opposed to negatives, supporting plaintiff actions including consumer actions.

For Docket 9288 and 9341 the core violation has always been contract, combination and conspiracy in an enterprise network fraud to conceal the Sherman Act Section 1 violation. A long time antitrust violation established on case precedent validated by established Clayton Act and RICO cases. This Section 1 violation has always been intended by Intel Combination and Cartel practice to monopolize markets maximizing their combined system economic benefit. Too limit and steal from competitors and manipulate consumers.

And has always been cost too consumers including hidden transport tax for product routing affixed to primary Dealer’s Intel intra platform PC end sales price. An illegal transport fee enabled by Intel and Dealers, taxed too consumers in PC end sales price, where 100% of this route fee is collected by Media Sales Agents many who are codefendant propagandists concealing their own involvement in these continuous enterprise network crimes.

In this Section 5 process failure Intel Network deflection from consumer to industry causes of action has been experienced by all of us. There can be no more reversing the obvious even as cover for FBI and DOJ investigative intervention.

Its time to bring this racketeering case into the public light so all citizens can be instructed how to report and remedy competition espionage occurring in the domestic work place in real time and not over eighteen years time.

Regardless of FTC intention or bumble Section 5 false start has been a blessing in its success to reveal yet another Intel Network manipulation of federal regulatory and law enforcement. Including Intel Network media misrepresenting 9341 proposed consent agreement, as the final FTC settlement, prior to Commissioner’s November 1st acceptance. Limiting awareness of public comment opportunity?

Resulting in Commission acceptance I can not agree with on lacking remedies. However discovery and remedies that still support the consumer case, State by State if necessary, on exact causes of action freed from its industrial divergence. Now focused on consumer harms from Section 1 contract, combination and conspiracy for Cartel price fixed product routing raising consumer PC price 6%.

Section 5 ambiguities presenting a vague case disconnected from its complete set of facts has in fact benefited follow on case work from FTC exposure in a first round of Intel Network Judo. And will the FTC or Department of Justice now respond with Federal Jujitsu and Karate? Will State Attorney Generals? Will private actions?

For FTC 9341 refilled under Clayton Act within the wrapper of Sherman, Clayton Act and RICO findings is an easily won round two toward recovering $47 billion stolen by Intel Network from consumers.

And for industry plaintiffs to prove their commercial claims and recover financial harms under Section 2 assuring remedies that yield no undesirable concessions to Intel Network.

Having participated in a technical assistant capacity for both Docket 9288 and 9341, I agree with academic attorneys today who’ve chastised FTC hunting for antitrust causes of action that might fit under the Section 5 umbrella. What a waste of time Section 5 has been in relation to focused address on specific structure and system causes that are Section 1 and Clayton Act per se condemnation’s of law that are proofs of Section 2 intent to monopolize and economic theft.

“The enforcement of free competition is the least business can expect”.
President Franklin Roosevelt

Intel Inside Tied Charge Back in Summary

Building on prior analysis reflecting on Intel Inside tied charge back the system metric can be summed up thus. That Intel Dealing Cartel combined cross enterprise cross market too venture back its own Cartel channel development in advance of the Intel microprocessor supply ramp.

Where Intel and PC Dealers paid for their media channel’s expansion plan from Intel rebate fee credits earned in advance on every future computer sale from a predetermined production plan. Presenting the basis of the laundering violation; USC 1956, well before Docket 9341 identified Intel off the book kickbacks to Dell and how many others recorded as PC sales revenue.
A cartel venture which combines a minimum of six separate markets; x86 microprocessors, PC component platforms, Windows Operating System & Applications, PC design producers, investment banking and the media.

With their push through system enabled between Intel Dealer Entry and Media Channel Exit Points from November 1991 through approximately 2006. After which push through system is more tightly coupled by Intel to individual PC Dealers on redesigned tying mechanisms that Docket 9341 and EUCC record as bribes and kickbacks.

Where Intel in combination with primary PC Dealer’s and Media Sales Agents agreed to redirect revenues from Intel and PC Dealers stockholder’s, disguised as legitimate sales costs, too pay for the combination’s Media Sales Agent channel build out from 1993 through Pentium 4 exponential growth.

A period of commercial set up by the Combined Cartel where Media Sales Agent’s promote Intel microprocessors routed in Dealer’s computers to end buyers tied to their own media revenue generation ahead of the Intel supply ramp.

A supply ramp detailed two year’s in advance on Micro Design Resource Intel forecast (now suspect as the actual Intel supply schedule by this analyst) under the ownership of the Ziff Davis Soft Bank Companies (1995 – 2000) headquartered in New York, New York and Tokyo, Japan. Followed in 2000 MDR purchase by Cahners Publishing from ZD Market Intelligence merged into Cahner’s Instat Market Research Group. In period ZDNet computer titles are purchased from SoftBank by CNET through final peak of Intel Inside tied charge back program.

In addition to Ziff Davis prominent Media Sales Agents include IDG PC World, CMP Windows Magazine, other technical and mass media; ZDTV?

Sales agency that would last through the cartel’s implosion in 2005/6 on hard copy publishing reconfiguration toward Internet dissemination compounded by Intel process hurdle to race microprocessor frequency past 3.8 GHz. A period where Intel artificial press of process lithography to maintain its fabrication monopoly morphs from tied charge back to first dollar and loyalty rewards which are clearly the outcome of a continuous racket.

“The essential subordinate status of social justice as a goal of rational political discontent is illustrated by the principle that any group will find it eventually unprofitable to redistribute income toward itself at the cost even of the smallest decline in the rate of economic development.
For any group which succeeds in such a redistribution there will be some year in the future beyond which it will be worse off in an absolute sense because it effected the initial redistribution in its favor.
Social Justice in Social Dynamics
Richard Brandt, 1961

Twenty year ironies of Intel domestic PC protectionism are three fold. First, the cost impact on society exposed to artificial accelerants, systematic growth and concentration of the Dealing group. Second, a combined cartel that did not deliver domestic PC protectionism but the system means for domestic economic theft.

Third, with Toshiba and NEC limited to secondary status in the PC dealing group, Soft Bank purchase of Ziff Davis and then teamed with CNET (CNET up to 10% Intel owned in period) positioned both media companies, along with International Data Group’s PC World, to capture majority of Intel Inside margin rewards through the tied charge back program.

The cartel did not protect domestic industry but acted as the catalyst for inter nation organized attachment. Soft Bank who purchased Ziff Davis in 1995 knew exactly the benefits of Meizaru Kieretsu (hidden cartel) operating within the Intel Zaibatsu (vertical monopoly business conglomerate). Is this what Intel monopoly was meant to protect? And in respect to Soft Bank, why not, Intel Combine is an American Cartel.

Cross enterprise cross directorate because this sort of business combination can’t be coordinated singularly and requires mutual cooperation and direction. Although the network responsible for cartel operation’s including executives of Ziff Davis and other media responsible for enterprise infiltration to fill Cartel key man positions, in PC companies and Intel competitors, did attempt to keep the cartel’s coordination a secret.

From publisher’s top executives and regional ad reps who coordinated the placement’s to advertising and public relation agency personnel who policed the Intel sales system while acting as informant transfer bridges (along with some journalists) from Intel competitors back into Intel. The competitive rape of enterprises, industry and country for Intel tied charge back ad space sales, space commissions, publisher and agency directed client assignments and sustained employment that are network rewards of cartel membership.
A secret scheme reported by this analyst to his employers Cyrix, NexGen, ARM and AMD beginning 1991 through 1996 caused by Agent solicitations. On employer inaction and IntelNetwork Retaliation, followed by first reports to FBI in the summer and fall 1996.

Which was not the beginning of a legal system failure, but the beginning of an escalation in legal failures that has always plagued Intel case matter’s right up through 9341 result and the writing of this briefing today.

Intel monopoly profits are once again at their traditional inflated high. And that is because corporate fiduciary responsibilities, governance, regulatory and some in the Bar; no doubt specializing in serving white collar crime to sustain their attorney employments, have kept democracy stuck in Intel failure mode within the Intel lie that is a panacea of best practices meant to conceal criminal practice.
With Intel Network thumbing their noses and beating their chest’s in a victory over the FTC masking organized network crime. Where Intel CFO Smith on News Hour October 13 is positioned in front of posters that are microprocessor die photos resembling in gold hue the commercial bastions of Wall Street that are lower Manhattan office towers. Intel clinging too this constituency for support offers one indicator that all is not well in Intel Land.

Intel Network is responsible for a lot of looting and laundering; $42 billion# by Intel and Dealer financial records on Intel Inside explicit contract and tacit administration of the tying system. Taken from Intel and Dealer stockholders, advanced to media, intended to limit participation and monopolize their combined supply and distribution system.

These stolen funds sit waiting for consumer recovery within Intel, PC Dealer and some Media enterprises. Also I would think partner profit from INTC QUANDA players made within their investment banking operations. Using a secret tool, riding on other people’s money, and suspect as never crediting gains back to client’s accounts?

For Docket 9341 Intel system structures prove intent to monopolize. Economic analysis points to monopoly consumer overcharge and Intel industrial price below cost. Intel explicit contractual agreements and their tacit provisions prove consumer price fixing of approximately 6%. All conduct proofs including commercial channel frauds are secondary in support.

There is no risk of antitrust false positive associated with these pointers to affirmative proofs; systems intent, consumer monopoly overcharge, industrial below cost, PC price fixing for holding the cartel and its tied distribution structure in place even now.

Added production examples on which 9341 consumer recovery is calculated.

Analysts June 4th brief estimates $88 billion in Intel consumer and industrial monopolization available for judicial recovery. Current consumer recovery estimate is approximately$47.2386 billion.

June 4th brief revision 2 and latter offers these three economic examples: Note: Graphs and economic plots not reprinted here available on request from author;

1) P3 code name Katmai 512 Desktop Performance pointer to consumer monopoly
overcharge of $300,990,000 and $764,517,480 in Intel Inside charge back values.

2) P3 code name Copper Mine 128 Value Mobile pointer to industrial monopolization;
$2,780,853,050 revenue less than average fixed cost, $351,211,950 less than variable
cost suspect below marginal cost end of run, and $187,923,900 in charge back values.

3) Cartel signaling embedded in P3 Xeon Tanner and P3 Cascades product dumping
Not repeated here in its average weighted price version shows a steeper sheer
over Cascade than average price. Average price calculation tempts some QUANDA
traders to play. Those players likely lost on this short run in relation to average
weighted players who knew too stay away from run down values.

Pentium 3 Katmai 512 Performance Desktop and P3 Copper Mine 128 (Celeron) Value Mobile are shown again below in their updated average weighted price versions. In this brief now joined by Pentium 3 Copper Mine 256 Performance Desktop, Pentium 3 Copper Mine 256 Performance Mobile and P3 Copper Mine 128 (Celeron) Value Desktop.

Consumer overcharge, industrial monopolization, Intel Inside tied charge back is now estimated on refined average weighted price method, for 23 production short runs, in progress for discovery purposes.

As anticipated from note in July 4th brief analyst refinement from average price, to average weighted price on infra marginal speed splits, is causing the consumer recovery estimate to grow in value.

Economic analysis including latest input to FTC on October 29 is now calculated on Intel average weighted price on MDR Intel quantity estimates, by microprocessor frequency speed split, at Intel 1,000 piece stated price.

Resulting in ability to calculate consumer monopoly overcharge on exact infra marginal product quantities at monopoly price. Infra marginal ‘short lots’ of Intel microprocessors subjecting consumers to monopoly price overcharge associated with Dealer’s newest PC product introductions. Also where Intel Inside commission tied charge back values too Media Sales Agents are at their highest values.

Refined economic analysis beginning 9341 review period; January 1999 through 2002 is here meant to validate Intel monopolization before, during and following Docket 9288 negotiated settlement. With the objective of confirming Intel employee perjuries and criminal network manipulation of Docket 9288 result including this analyst’s push under in a covert security sting at that time.

A sting that includes by production record Intel executives, Intel security operators, three private security firms and regional law enforcement believed to be the working associates of corporate and contract security personnel. Analyst’s aim here is to show cause on witness tampering in an obstruction of justice; affirmative act of constructed fraud.

Too offer causal proof for forestalling 9288 remedies and Intel Network aim to disrupt the administration of justice in all following State, Federal and civil actions and case investigations.

Below from August 2000 find one of hundreds of analyst’s FTC and CDOJ original submittals to Messrs. Lin, Pitofsky at FTC, Mr. Greene at CDOJ, Ms. Reno, Mr. Klein USDOJ, entire Senate Judicial Committee followed by supporting economic pointers of Intel intent to monopolize and for proving Docket 9288 manipulated obstruction.

“True reasons of the distinction upon which the probation's of voluntary restraints are founded are: 1st, the mischief which may arise from them, first to the party by the loss of his livelihood, and the substance of his family; 2ndly, to the public, by depriving it of a useful member.

Another reason is, the great abuses these voluntary restraints are liable to; as for instance, from corporations, who are perpetually laboring for exclusive advantages in trade, and to reduce it into as few hands as possible; as likewise from masters who are apt to give their apprentices much vexation on this account, and to use many indirect practices to procure such bonds from them, in their custom, when they come to set up for themselves . C.J. Parker delivering resolution of court in Mitchell vs. Reynolds, King’s Bench, 1711, 1 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep 347

Following eight examples 1998 through mid 2002 are meant to show economic cause why Intel Network manipulation of FTC v Intel Docket 9288. That cause is intent to monopolize markets actively concealed in real time at that time by an inter nation cartel.

Monopoly pointers from MDR advance Intel production estimates, segmented by speed split, when multiplied by Intel Stated 1,000 piece price reveals a QUANDA relied on by INTC inside stock traders, PC Dealer procurement and Media Sales Agents.

A network game to calculate Intel revenue and margin potential on future Intel product route purchases including tied charge back values to Media Sales Agents out into future time. Note mechanism for cartel stock pumping 2002 demonstrated to FTC before October 29.

On average weighted price analysis analyst now suspects MDR estimates are the Intel supply schedule. The product of virtual network resource does MDR validate Intel production plan? Intel relies on external resources from which the organization gleans other’s ideas and makes them Intel’s ideas.

This analyst’s marketing ideas and plans have been gleaned by Intel marketing. Trailed in the field and made into a feature exhibit at one Intel marketing department luncheon; don’t talk to that guy at the Intel trade show booth was their aim to inform marketing and sales personnel. One of several encounters court ordered production shows Intel theft of analyst market plans from AMD in 1996.

Separate, analyst record for AMD Security that is theft of NexGen K6 development schedule and the transfer of NexGen AMD confidential product details to Intel in period.

“From a scientific standpoint, what counts is knowledge not talk . . . if we want to continue to talk metaphorically about things called answers, then we still do better to speak about finding the answer, than making it . . .”

- Gabriel Stolzenberg, Inquiry into the Foundation of Mathematics

New to this revision 3.0 brief find Pentium ll Deschutes 512 Performance Mobile at .25 micron followed by Pentium ll Dixon 256 Performance Mobile at .25 and .18 micron process lithography.

Below Pentium ll Deschutes 512 Performance Mobile indicating consumer monopoly overcharge > $537 on infra marginal quantity ‘speed splits’ at Intel stated 1,000 piece price.

On $25,679,260,000 revenue from total production of 77,952,000 units, consumer monopoly overcharge on infra marginal production of 1,580,000 units is $714,695,000. Intel Inside tied charge back to Media Sales Agents on total revenue at 3% commission multiplied x2 representing Dealer Media Trigger and Intel Media Sales Agent kickback is $1,499.250,480. Total consumer overcharge and price fixing consumer recoverable from Pll Deschutes 512 Performance Mobile production short run is $2,501,907,280.

Above Pentium ll Dixon 256 Performance Mobile including price below Average Total Cost and suspect below Marginal Cost at end of run. For revenue of $6,104,196,000 on 18,029,000 units estimates industrial monopolization from dumping at cost monopsony period three at $1,574,703,000 where price is less than competitive equilibrium price range $329 to $350. Followed by $1,128,636,000 industrial monopolization periods four and five where price is less than Average Total Cost of $292 and suspect below Marginal Cost for .18 micron process lithography. Total industrial monopolization on 10,057,000 units estimates $2,703,339,000 approximate. Intel Inside tied charge back consumer recovery value associated with this Intel mobile short run is $360,851,760.

Above revised P3 Katmai 512 Performance Desktop now indicating consumer monopoly overcharge > $450 on infra marginal quantity ‘speed splits’ at Intel stated 1,000 piece price. On $12,741,958,000 revenue from total production of 34,124,000 units, consumer monopoly overcharge on infra marginal production of 11,195 880 units is $1,022,694,800.

Intel Inside tied charge back to Media Sales Agents on total revenue at 3% commission multiplied x2 representing Dealer Media Trigger and Intel Media Sales Agent kickback is $764,517,480. Total consumer overcharge and price fixing recoverable from P3 Katmai 512 Performance Desktop production short run is $1,787,212,280.

“An environment where hard work works the worker out of work, parsimony produces unemployment, price systems redistribute wealth without regard to worldly virtues, net worth disappears in deflation, earned interest and pensions evaporate in inflation, where the speculator and the manipulator reap the rewards of their competitive elimination through forms of economic theft that shift an industrial market’s relative values”.

Mike Bruzzone, Camp Marketing Brief U.S. Senate Edition, January 2003

Below P3 Copper Mine 256 Performance Desktop indicating consumer monopoly overcharge > $450 on infra marginal speed splits by Intel 1,000 piece stated price. Note consumer surcharge periods two and three on Dealer monopsony price suggesting Intel horizontal predatory price move supporting P3 Tualatin 256 extension of Copper Mine 256 run down volumes period five through ten. Note consumer surcharge periods two and three on Dealer monopsony price suggesting Intel horizontal predatory price move supporting P3 Tualatin 256 extension of Copper Mine 256 run down volumes period five through ten.

Above P3 Performance Desktop on MDR Intel supply schedule estimate 1 shows $37,995,339,220 revenue on 136,364,000 units. Consumer monopoly overcharge on infra marginal production of 7,150,000 units is $1,103,498,344.

Consumer surcharge from monopsony setting up for predatory price on run down volumes period five through ten is $1,348,392,000. Intel Inside charge back to Media Sales Agents on total revenue at 3% tied back charge multiplied x2 representing Intel kickback and Dealer trigger is $2,279,720,353. Total consumer recoverable from P3 Copper Mine 256 Performance Desktop production short run equals $4,731,610,697.

“Monopoly or monospony represents a kind of knot, kink, or distortion in the general field of the economic relationships, or a toll gate in the network of economic communications which enables some individuals to capture and exploit power positions which otherwise competitive forces would have eroded away.

The Principle of Personal Responsibility
Presentation to the Catholic Economic Association, 1953

Below P3 Copper Mine 256 Performance Mobile indicating consumer monopoly overcharge > $450 on infra marginal speed split by Intel 1,000 piece stated price. Note consumer surcharge periods four through seven for Dealer monopsony price suggesting Intel horizontal predatory price move period eight on P3 Tualatin 256 extension of Copper Mine 256 run down volumes through period ten. Tualatin 256 price regulates upward Copper mine 256 end of run average weighted price and in its own short run adds to the consumer monopoly overcharge value.

P3 Performance Mobile on MDR supply schedule estimate 2 shows $20,735,225,000 revenue on 57,050,000 units. Consumer monopoly overcharge on infra marginal production of 16,325,000 units is $1,323,710,000. Consumer surcharge period’s four through seven for Dealer monopsony benefit and Intel predatory price on run down volumes is $1,440,325.000.

Intel Inside tied charge back to Media Sales Agents on total revenue at 3% tied back charge multiplied x2 representing Intel kickback and Dealer trigger is $1,244,053,500. Total consumer recoverable from P3 Copper Mine 256 Performance Mobile production short run equals $4,008,088,500.

Below P3 Copper Mine 128 (Celeron) Value Desktop priced at and below fixed cost. On revenue of $7,753,871,000 on 86,740,000 units estimates industrial monopolization of $384,704,000 at Average Fixed Cost of $136. Further industrial monopolization of $7,405,167,000 where price is at or less than Average Variable Cost of $117 and suspect below Marginal Cost. Intel Inside tied charge back consumer recovery value associated with this Intel desktop short run is $465,232,260.

Below Pentium 3 Celeron Value Mobile priced at and below fixed cost. Revenue of $3,132,065,000 on 25,790,000 units estimates industrial monopolization of $2,780,853,050 where price is less than Average Fixed Cost of $136; and $351,211,50 industrial monopolization where price is at or less than Average Variable Cost of $117 and suspect below Marginal Cost at production end of run. Intel Inside tied charge back consumer recovery value associated with this Intel mobile short run is $187,923,900.

Next Pentium 4 Willamette 256 Performance Desktop indicating consumer monopoly overcharge > $450 on infra marginal speed splits by Intel 1,000 piece stated price. Analysis is simply that run is to long and price too low.

Consider the industrial social effect of at cost dumping monopsony periods six and seven and excess volume at period eight end of run.

Always calculating on the conservative periods four and seven priced below average total cost are close enough to efficient end of run scenario within $73 of monopoly competitive equilibrium and $95 of average total cost respectively. Both periods show the artificially low price inherent with all run down volumes and this short run overall.

Below P4 Performance Desktop on MDR Intel supply schedule estimate 1 shows $11,241,349,546 revenue on 49,594,000 units. Consumer monopoly overcharge on infra marginal production of 2,200,000 units is $449,745,000. Intel Inside charge back to Media Sales Agents on total revenue at 3% tied back charge multiplied x2 representing Intel kickback and Dealer trigger is $674,480,973. Total consumer recoverable from P4 Willamette 256 Performance Desktop production short run is $1,124,225,973.

Pentium 4 Foster 256 Xeon Workstation not shown here indicates $128,458,490 total consumer recovery from monopoly overcharge and tied charge back fix on 5,728,000 units and $1,616,119,000 revenue. Of interest both P4 short runs compared to P3 is tied charge back value now walking away in excess of the consumer monopoly overcharge values.

Summary of Intel Network Recovery Values; in Part 1/98 through 6/02; revision 3 method.

Consumer Monopoly Price Overcharge = $ 4,645,834,414
Consumer Surcharge Monopsony Price = $ 2,788,717,000
Consumer Tied Charge Back Price Fix = $ 6,073,747,316
Partial Consumer Recovery = $13,508,298,730

Industrial Monopolization Price < afc =" $">
Industrial Monopolization Price < mc =" $">
Industrial Monopolization Price < avc =" $">
Partial Industrial Recovery = $12,050,572,000

Note at cost dumping is calculated for FTC across 23 production short runs. However not recorded here as industrial monopolization when price is above average fixed cost pending that intent to monopolize outcome in litigation.

Microsoft industrial social harm calculated from eight Intel production short runs herein suggests $5,648,808,000 monopolization at $48 OEM price attached horizontally by Microsoft OEM license to 117,621,000 Intel microprocessors priced less than Intel marginal cost to produce. Up to $8,138,428,800 on $48 OEM price attached horizontally by Microsoft OEM license to 169,550,600 Intel microprocessors priced less than Intel Average Total Cost to produce.

In Conclusion

On pointers and proofs whether Intel employees and witnesses perjured themselves in aNetwork multipoint manipulation of the FTC, to deflect from core causes of action in Docket 9288, and again in 9341 are clear. System, structure, economic, conduct pointers and proofs examined under lens of legal case precedent reveals this fact. A premeditated network obstruction to forestall remedies and disrupt the administration of justice in all Intel case matters over the last twelve years including now.

Intel Network case matters are about insuring innovation production short run to short run. Assuring civil rights while preserving ability to innovate based on examples that demonstrateIntel methods of creative destruction can be very destructive economically, structurally, holistically and socially.

Intel Network RICO is proven. Section 1 and Section 2 case proofs wait to be discovered by FTC or sit delivered at FTC and DOJ.

I look forward to open Intel hearings for a transparency that will educate every American on forms of domestic economic terrorism caused by illegal monopolization, combinations, cartels, frauds, theft, deceit and the cover ups that have stymied these Intel Network case matters from their complete remedies and resolutions for over a decade.

Respectfully Submitted
Mike Bruzzone
Camp Marketing

FBI Original Source of Intel Network RICO; 1996

FTC Invited field reporter Docket 9288, 1998-2000
CDOJ and NYDOJ first to report; 1998
CDOJ lettered to work report; Intel Section 1 Framework; 2000 –
SEC Notice; 2007

U.S. Attorney NCD recognized FCA Relator; 2008
FTC voluntary analyst Docket 9341; under Labor Code 3363.5; 2009

More on Intel Corruption at

Posted Here by Investigative Blogger
Crystal L. Cox